Illustrating some of these trends, Khalid al-Gibara, a former leader of the local Sunni tribal PMF force in al-Alam that calls itself the Sons of Alam, described how his forces formed. In addition to making his initial connection through AAH , al-Gibara said that financial payments and other supporting weaponry and supplies arrive from Baghdad irregularly.
The mobilization of the oldest and most operational of the Sunni PMF in ad-Dour, the Shammari brigade drawn from Shammar tribesmen , followed a different pattern. Leaders of the local Shammar tribe were called to Baghdad in specifically to ask them to form a local force, which would work on the ground with both Badr and AAH.
This ad hoc formation and assignment process continued as of the time of writing. In late Spring , a new Sunni PMF force was started by a local Dour Sunni leader based in Baghdad, and was specifically created to act as auxiliaries to Khorasani brigades in the area. The number of distinct Sunni PMF units in an area, the strength of these individual units, and the role they play varies considerably and is continually evolving.
The tribal force engagement in Tikrit has manifested differently than in al-Alam and Dour, and has been dominated more by tribal forces originating from outside Tikrit than by home-grown forces. However, there was sparse information about the role of this recently formed and very small force and its affiliation. More prominently, in the year following liberation, there were frequent reports of Sunni PMF from other areas periodically residing in Tikrit. The additional presence of these tribal forces has only contributed to the overall number of armed groups in Tikrit, making it more difficult to control security and limit lawlessness.
Sunni PMF from other areas have been directly connected to some of the violence in Tikrit. The looting and lawlessness perpetrated by tribal PMFs in Tikrit and other areas begets the much larger question of how these PMF groups both Shia and Sunni are impacting stability and the restoration of everyday life and regular rule of law in the Tikrit area. While the PMF dynamics certainly inhibit return, the obstacles of return are much broader and deeper.
Lack of return has not only been a question of fear of reprisals, but directly blocked access partly by PMF but also local government authorities and communities. There certainly have been fewer overall returns in PMF controlled areas, as discussed in the research summary on Baiji , than in areas like Tikrit or al-Alam where there is full government control.
In August , the Salah al-Din governorate council issued a decree stating that anyone found to have been complicit or affiliated with ISIL had no right to return to the governorate. However, it is widely known and interviews and other research studies suggest it has been the basis for local authorities or PMF forces at checkpoints and vetting centers to deny IDPs the right to return, and for members of the local community to destroy the property of those associated with ISIL.
Local tribes have also established a high bar for these ISIL families to be accepted back into communities. One prominent sheikh and provincial council member, Sheikh Khamis, noted a tribal agreement in al-Alam to pardon tribes that had supported ISIL and integrate their members back into the community if they: 1 openly declared that their members who had joined ISIL had been wrong; 2 they rejected contact with them and refused to support them; and, 3 demolished their homes. ISIL families who did this including by cutting off contact with, or support for, sons and fathers who were ISIL fighters would be allowed back into the community, according to this agreement.
Given the unstable security situation, it would be hard to describe the situation in the Tikrit area as fully normalized. Most locals and analysts interviewed said that the divided security architecture was not able to enforce law and order on a daily basis to protect civilians, and would be unable to withstand future attacks, or contain instability produced by future political competition.
In the future, most local officials and community leaders favor returning full control to government actors and disbanding, or removing, PMFs from major security responsibilities in the governorate. Those interviewed argued that the presence of multiple, competing armed groups was unhelpful and, similar to Sunni leaders in Ninewa, most expressed a desire to have the Iraqi government resume full control of security.
As the Provincial Council Member Mr. Mahmoud Zaki also contributed significantly to the research and analysis. In interviews for this study, the mayor and local security officials estimated that the population of Tikrit was between , and , Other reports have estimated it at approximately , pre-ISIL.
For that reason, it was not possible to survey as wide a sample of local officials, community leaders, and residents as in other areas. Those interviewed may reflect a particular leaning toward Sunni tribal fighters, given their affiliation. One leading tribal elder and political representative, Shaikh Marwan Nagi al-Gibara, estimated that the number of forces in the different Sunni tribal PMF units in both Dour and al-Alam totaled some 2 , fighters, with another 1 , fighters active in the unit that operates in Tikrit.
Some took up residence in Kirkuk, but many of those who did were expelled from the city by Kurdish officials and moved on to either Erbil or Suleimaniya from there many would eventually fly down to Baghdad. Fleeing often involved tense run-ins at ISIS checkpoints. Thirty minutes into his journey, he was stopped by a group of ISIS fighters. He explained that he was on his way to pick up some relatives and bring them back to Tikrit, but could see that the fighters were unconvinced by his story.
Mohamed then burst into a long tirade on the merits of the Islamic State and urged them to defeat the United States and its Zionist allies. But he noticed little enthusiasm for this argument either. They reassured him they would ultimately be victorious. Mohamed was allowed to proceed south where he quickly encountered pro-Baghdad forces. As more and more people fled, ISIS dropped any pretense that it was there to protect the local population.
At first, the militants would occupy the homes of security and provincial officials on the basis that their property had been annexed by the Islamic State. As the city emptied, the militants came to consider any abandoned property as fair game: hundreds of houses were broken into and looted.
Televisions, refrigerators, chairs, tables, all furniture and appliances were stolen. The offensive to liberate Tikrit, launched in March , involved a disparate group of armed groups, including regular forces, militias, volunteer fighters, local tribal forces, Iranian advisers, and US war planes.
Since the liberation, hundreds of criminals have been operating freely, looting and destroying property. In one district, more than a quarter of the homes were destroyed after its liberation, and reports of property destruction are still coming in. The elected provincial council and the governor have not been able to return to the city. Municipal services have yet to be restored and few businesses have reopened. Although the terrorist organization appears to have been uprooted for now, the circumstances that allowed its takeover—above all a decrepit and corrupt security administration and the failure to uphold the rule of law amid a sustained campaign of assassinations and extortion—still exist today.
Restoring order will be impossible until the city is able to restore security and hold criminals and terrorists to account. Meanwhile, many Tikritis, scattered in temporary housing in various parts of Iraq, have been reduced to wondering if they will ever be allowed to return home. Best of The New York Review, plus books, events, and other items of interest. Zaid Al-Ali is an Iraqi lawyer.
Read Next. Its ability to maintain power depends overwhelmingly on outright repression. As Iraq prepares for its first national election in four years, the speed with which the new political order has fallen apart is a puzzle. The world is witnessing a humanitarian catastrophe of historic proportions. News about upcoming issues, contributors, special events, online features, and more. The New York Review of Books: recent articles and content from nybooks. I consent to having NYR add my email to their mailing list.
Submit a letter: Email us letters nybooks. Sarah Birke. Max Rodenbeck. A number of human rights organizations have accused the Shiite militias of carrying out revenge attacks on Sunnis in newly-recaptured towns, or destroying their homes so they can never return. Some Shiite militias have set up checkpoints on the southern approaches of Tikrit, and stop passing cars to check for looted goods. A satellite image of Tikrit, released in February by the United nations, showed that at least buildings in the city have been affected by the fighting.
Of those, at least were completely destroyed and were severely damaged. In the heart of the city, Iraqi policemen are out in full force, along with explosives experts working to clear remaining roadside bombs and booby traps left behind by the militants.
Those responsible include not only direct participants in the criminal acts but commanders implicated as a matter of command responsibility. It signals to the Sunni residents of these areas that their fear of returning to an area under unchecked rule of militias is justified. It also bodes ill for the communities of Anbar and Nineveh province now under abusive ISIS rule, since Prime Minister Abadi has ordered the Popular Mobilization Forces to take part in the campaign to retake these provinces.
The United Nations as well as the United States, Iran, and other countries involved in the conflict in Iraq should publicly condemn militia abuses in the armed conflict with ISIS and press the Iraqi government to fully and impartially investigate alleged war crimes by militia forces.
The UN Human Rights Council should extend the mandate of its fact-finding commission and include militia abuses. In light of abuses by Iraqi pro-government militias documented in this report and elsewhere, the United States, Iran and other countries providing military assistance to Iraq should urge and support Iraq to undertake concrete and verifiable reforms to hold perpetrators of serious abuses accountable, integrate pro-government militias into a centralized command structure subject to civilian oversight and control, and ensure that those forces fully adhere to international humanitarian law.
These countries should require Iraq to report publicly within one year on progress towards implementing these reforms, after which they should suspend military assistance and sales commensurate with Iraqi compliance gaps on those reforms. We conducted 20 of the interviews in person between April 27 and May 7, in Erbil and Sulaimaniya in the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq, and in the city of Kirkuk, which lies kilometers northeast of Tikrit and nine by telephone between May and July Human Rights Watch researchers did not visit Tikrit or the other towns covered in this report because only security personnel and select media received permission to visit at the time.
Nearly all interviews were conducted in Arabic. We informed all interviewees about the purpose and voluntary nature of the interviews, and the ways in which the information would be collected and used, and obtained consent by all interviewees, who understood they would receive no compensation for their participation.
Due to the risk of reprisals, Human Rights Watch has withheld the names and identifying information of several persons interviewed, in particular those of police officers. Human Rights Watch obtained over photographs of damaged buildings and worked with residents to identify their location.
Researchers spoke to the persons who had taken the photos in most instances to verify that the houses depicted were in the areas under scrutiny. Further, we used satellite imagery to determine the probable methods of destruction, locate deployments of militia and government military vehicles in areas of active destruction, as well as to control for damage from airstrikes and possible heavy artillery and mortar fire that occurred before March 6, during the battle for the areas between ISIS and pro-government forces.
Human Rights Watch presented its basic findings to the Iraqi government in a letter requesting information on July 17, , requesting a response by August As of August 24, we had received no response. ISIS was responsible for numerous serious violations of the laws of war and human rights abuses during the nine months it held Tikrit, al-Alam, al-Dur and other areas in Salah al-Din province. Among the most notorious ISIS atrocities was the mass execution of at least Shia recruits from the Camp Speicher military facility just north of Tikrit city in June , in the days immediately after the takeover.
ISIS itself claimed it executed 1, men from Camp Speicher and the government says it has retrieved the remains of close to bodies. During its control of the province, ISIS frequently carried out summary executions. Several witnesses told Human Rights Watch that on June 12, , one day after ISIS took the city, four local security officials and their driver tried to leave Tikrit. Only the driver returned, with the bodies of the four officers who had each been shot in the head.
One of the witnesses said he recognized two of the dead men as his neighbors from the Rajab family, and delivered their bodies to their families before helping the driver escape.
ISIS numbered in the hundreds at most. ISIS had carried out targeted killings and engaged in extortion for months before taking over towns in Salah al-Din province. Do what is right and pay your share. We are the Islamic State.
Serving security forces and political figures knew that ISIS would likely target them as agents of the state they were fighting. A journalist, an aid worker with an international organization, and a government official with the election commission told Human Rights Watch they left Tikrit soon after the arrival of ISIS, as they knew their work would bring them into confrontation with the new authorities. By February , all but perhaps 10 percent of the original population had deserted their homes for the apparent safety of other areas, in Baghdad, Anbar, Kirkuk, or the Kurdish region, a number of residents told Human Rights Watch.
Schools and shops closed and, while essential supplies remained available, the price of gas and fuel tripled. Public life became more tightly regulated, former residents told Human Rights Watch.
ISIS gradually instituted new rules based on their vision of Sharia: men could no longer meet in cafes to enjoy water pipes and games, people could no longer wear jeans and other Western clothes, and women could only leave the house with a male relative and fully veiled.
Judges, judicial investigators, and lawyers had to pay lower fees. Local supporters of ISIS, who wore masks so that residents would not know their identities, publicly posted lists of wanted people. The lists often numbered in the hundreds and within weeks ISIS began arresting security officers.
Some residents stayed despite misgivings about ISIS and in some cases worked against the armed group. After ousting ISIS in early March , Shia militias destroyed his house and stole large quantities of cash and gold from a safe he kept, Sheikh Malik said, showing pictures a local policeman had sent him on April 11 of his house and the smashed safe.
A combination of forces of the Iraqi army, the Federal Police, Shia militias and other Popular Mobilization Forces that had slowly fought their way up the Tigris captured al-Dur on March 6, and later the rural town of al-Alam around March 8, before circling back to Tikrit from the north and chasing the remaining ISIS fighters out. Then, as in al-Dur after March 6 and in al-Alam after March 8, residents alleged that the Shia militias began razing the towns apparently in revenge for perceived support for ISIS and in order to settle old scores against Sunni officers who served under Saddam Hussein.
Al-Dur lies 20 kilometers to the south of Tikrit on the east bank of the Tigris. The town had a population of about , However the army withdrew one or two days later, leaving the town to militias in the Popular Mobilization Forces. In the complicated web of historical animosities playing out in the current conflict in Iraq, Shia political rhetoric tends to lump together supporters of ISIS with forces loyal to the disbanded Baath party and with retired senior officers who had served under Saddam Hussein.
Estimates of the extent of the destruction of houses by arson or explosives in al-Dur vary. There appears to be no definitive list of damaged and destroyed buildings. Residents of al-Dur who fled to the Kurdish region have compiled a list of damaged buildings, including houses destroyed, torched houses and 95 damaged shops. Satellite imagery taken after the recapture of al-Dur also shows those houses destroyed, in addition to significant destruction and damage in other parts of the town.
Human Rights Watch has compared photos and videos taken at the time government forces re-took al-Dur with others taken over the following six weeks, after the army withdrew. Imagery at the time of recapture comes from satellite pictures, television coverage, and videos by militiamen. Imagery of later destruction comes from satellites and private photographs and videos taken by al-Dur residents, mostly local policemen.
Another day, he said, he passed by a shop for car batteries that was undamaged but was burning the following day. Shia militias appear to have been responsible for the destruction of property in al-Dur following the defeat of ISIS. The town was largely undamaged before they entered, and only the militias and some local police were present at the time the destruction occurred.
The local police appear to be unlikely perpetrators, as they openly provided information about the destruction. Only limited destruction of buildings took place while al-Dur was under ISIS rule or as a result of fighting. His was one of only a few houses damaged by aerial bombing, he said.
Other sources confirmed that the town was largely intact when the army and militias recaptured al-Dur. An Al-Ittijah television broadcast accompanying the entry of Hizbollah Battalions into al-Dur on March 8, , shows little damage to the dozens of buildings shown in the broadcast.
Local security officials who returned immediately after Iraqi forces entered also painted a picture of a town largely unharmed.
Sheikh Malik, who was in touch with senior local security officials, said that the Hizbollah Battalions entered one or two days after ISIS had already vacated the town. Human Rights Watch reviewed a video filmed by a militia member in the town of al-Dur in early March In the video, an unidentified man lights a fuse of a large white plastic container in the home of a local resident, runs outside and seconds later the residential building explodes, completely destroying it.
Human Rights Watch arms experts concluded the explosive device was consistent with a makeshift fertilizer bomb composed of a detonator, propane gas tank and sacks of agricultural fertilizer, all components readily obtained locally and easily configured and deployed.
After recapturing al-Dur, the army retreated and only militias and local police remained in the town, police officers and other residents told Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch is unable to determine which militia or militias were responsible for particular acts of destruction.
Several Shia militias participated in the capture of al-Dur, including:. The League of the Righteous [56].
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